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Thomas W. Hazlett
The Comment by Albert Smiley' deals with both the economics
and policy implications of my analysis.2 In regard to the economics,
it questions the ability of competitive forces to improve consumer
welfare in local cable television markets, citing a host of arguments
in support of imperfect competition. As he readily concedes,
however, the necessary experiment has not been run: what will
happen when municipal entry barriers have been removed and firms
are free to compete? I have tried to answer this question by way of
induction through my analysis of particular markets. Based upon
evidence that prices decline and services can improve upon competi-
tive entry, I conclude that consumers would be well served by
allowing unpredictable rivalry to proceed. Although one might argue
that many or even most markets would fail to experience robust
competition, consumers face virtually no downside risk. Thus, the
experiment of competition is worth a try in all cable markets.
We have mounting evidence from the franchise monopoly
regulatory regime which exists now, as well as evidence from the
period before rate deregulation. Thus, this policy debate is far more
tractable than Smiley suggests. Smiley amends my conclusion
regarding open entry by saying that such a policy entails rewriting
the Cable Act of 1984, and, therefore, we ought to consider either
establishing auction mechanisms 4 for cable pricing schemes at the
municipal level outside of the franchise process, or restoring rate
regulation (as is being actively debated in Congress today).' Not-
withstanding Smiley's assertions, none of these policy conclusions
1. Smiley, Regulation and Competition in Cable Television, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (1990).
2. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YA.E
J. ON REG. 65 (1990).
3. See Smiley, supra note 1, at 133.
4. Auction mechanisms function when the municipality awards the franchise to the
firm offering the lowest prices.
5. Smiley, supra note 1, at 136 n.45.
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follows necessarily from my analysis. In fact, each is undesirable from
the perspective of consumer welfare.
I. The Evidence Supports Open Entry
Open entry does not require rewriting the Cable Act. It is
imprecise to say that the Cable Act blesses localities with the
authority to create franchise monopolies. The Ninth Circuit held in
Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles6 that creation of an
exclusive cable franchise was no more constitutional than was the
creation of a single newspaper permit. In examining the policy
mandate laid out in the Cable Act, the court noted that it could not
"agree with the suggestion in the legislative history that the provision
'grants to the franchising authority the discretion to determine the
number of cable operators to be authorized to provide service in a
particular geographic area."7 Open entry could be established
without rewriting the Act by courts holding exercise of municipal
franchise authority unconstitutional when used to prevent competi-
tion. Indeed, it appears that courts are beginning to do just this.8
Establishing auction mechanisms for cable pricing schemes is
another policy option that is inconsistent with my analysis, and
undesirable from the consumer's perspective. Although the auction
mechanism is a policy that is not experiencing widespread debate
today, it is reminiscent of so-called Demsetzian franchise monopoly
schemes in the economics literature." The "Dutch auction""
proposed in the Comment by Smiley has always been available to
local franchising authorities. The reason they have not employed it,
and the reason that Smiley's proposal is not being discussed in the
cable policy debate today, is that there is no effective way to regulate
rates or to extract non-price concessions via the auction method. The
problem with price auctioning is that quality differences between
bidders confuse the definition of lowest price." Not only is the
6. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affd 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
7. Id. at 1411 n.11.
8. The latest in this series has been rendered by Federal District Judge Consuelo
Marshall in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 83-5846 (C.D.
Cal. Jan. 5, 1990) (memorandum order).
9. I use the term "so-called" due to the manner in which the 1968 analysis by Harold
Demsetz has been interpreted in the policy literature. See Hazlett, Franchise Bidding and
Natural Monopoly: The Demsetz Solution on Cable (June 1989) (unpublished paper
presented at the Western Economic Association annual meeting, on file with author).
10. Smiley, supra note 1, at 136.
11. R. SCHMALANSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES 71-73 (1979).
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selection of a uniform product therefore necessary for the price
auction to establish any meaningful ranking, it is not clear what sort
of cable package consumers desire to purchase. Even if this informa-
tion were available, local governments may not set such program-
ming standards because the First Amendment protects cable
operators as "electronic publishers" and precludes such regulation.
Hence, it is difficult to speak either of price auctioning or rate
regulation, when product quality cannot be controlled."
Finally, the restoration of rate regulation is not a necessary policy
conclusion from my analysis, and is in fact inimical to consumer
interests. We know that municipal rate regulation did not increase
consumer welfare before that option was foreclosed by adoption of
the Cable Act in 1986. Although Zupan"5 found that local rate
regulation was associated with a large impact, the significance of this
finding is questionable because his sample of sixty-six cable systems
included only six which were deregulated. 4 Furthermore, they were
deregulated at the option of the municipal government itself, a fact
that suggests a problem of selection bias in the deregulated subset. 5
Zupan further concluded that political franchising authorities
imposed highly inefficient obligations in the form of wasteful
cross-subsidies on cable firms. 6 In my study 7 of nearly 300 cable
systems in California, I was able to observe 67 deregulated systems.
In contrast to the deregulated systems studied by Zupan, these
California systems were deregulated by state law. Thus, the selection
bias resulting from local government discretion disappears. My
results indicate that there were no welfare improvements from rate
regulation. Although nominal rates rose under decontrol, quality
(particularly number of channels on basic service) rose at least as
rapidly. The fact that output was not constrained after deregulation
is also revealing. Penetration actually rose, though by a statistically
12. It is wel-known that the first response of a price-regulated supplier is, assuming
a binding price ceiling, to lower product quality. Where quality is elastic, such responses
can quickly obviate the effectiveness of price controls. See R. MILLER & R. MEINFRS,
INTnRMXDIATE MICROECONOMICS 419 (3d ed. 1986). This outcome appears to obtain under
cable rate regulation, as discussed below.
13. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systematic Evidence, 32 J.L. & EcON 401 (1987).
14. Id.
15. Id. If the locality had the choice to regulate, but chose not to, is the resulting free
market price the product of deregulation or the consdous policy selection of the local
government?
16. Zupan, supra note 13.
17. T. Hazlett, The Demand to Regulate Franchise Monopoly: Evidence from CATV
Rate Deregulation in California (September 1989) (forthcoming in J. ECON. INQUIRY).
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insignificant amount in deregulated markets. This is just the reverse
of what would be predicted under the hypothesis that localities
choose to constrain rates below monopoly levels."
This ineffectiveness of local rate regulation is also convincingly
supported at the federal level by the recent survey of basic cable
prices and penetration pursuant to the Cable Act's deregulation by
the General Accounting Office (GAO).'" Examining evidence from
over 1,400 cable systems for the period December 1, 1986 to
October 31, 1988, the GAO found that the average number of
channels included in the most popular basic service package
increased from 27 to 32.0 Although the price of this package rose
twenty-six percent against a Consumer Price Index increase of about
six percent, mean price per channel rose from forty-four cents to
only forty-six cents, an increase less than the rate of inflation.2 '
Again, the key statistic-penetration-revealed that no output
restriction resulted from deregulation. Indeed, the average penetra-
tion rate increased from fifty-five percent to fifty-seven percent under
decontrol." Moreover, the GAO found thirty-four percent of cable
systems to be deregulated prior to the federal decontrol timetable,
thus giving observers a contemporaneous sample of cable prices to
compare to the newly unleashed prices. s The GAO measured
increases of twenty-four percent in this large control group, virtually
identical to the twenty-six percent increase in the deregulated
sample.24
Although local rate regulation appears to be ineffective in
lowering price, it remains a politically important tool. Price controls
are employed as an enforcement device to ensure that various
political agreements are followed by the cable franchisee. These
include cross-subsidy arrangements called for in the franchise, as well
as certain "off-budget" dealings, including campaign contributions to
incumbents. Both municipal and cable industry lobbyists concur that
securing the benefits of these marginal dealings is the real purpose
18. Id.
19. UNITED STATE GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE., NATIONAL SURVEY OF CABLE
TELEVISION RATES AND SERVICES (August 1989). The Cable Act deregulated rates in most
markets as of December 29, 1986.
20. Id. at 1-2.
21. Id. at 2, 26.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. at 4.
24. Id.
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of price control.'" To argue that such a tool is unneeded because
cities have the option of issuing competitive franchises ignores the
fact that this alternative constitutes a MAD (mutual assured destruc-
tion) policy. Municipal issuance of competitive franchises would
destroy the monopoly, but municipal authorities would not benefit
from this. Delaying rate increases is a far more viable tool, as the
city council may simply play a waiting game without relinquishing its
essential jurisdiction to determine the level of profits or their
assignment.
II. The Need to Recognize Politics in Analysis
This analysis began with the original hole in the Smiley trade-off:
there was no consideration of the actual political competition waged
in the assessment of the entry rules. However, an appreciation of
relevant political forces in policy analysis is important. Smiley's
contention that I give no weight to consumer interests is true only
in the limit. My basic theory is that consumer interests are relatively
under-represented with respect to those of monopoly suppliers and
incumbent politicians. This theory does not assume that consumers
are irrational. Indeed, I cite the three specific instances known to me
where consumers were allowed to vote on cable competition, and
voted their interests overwhelmingly.6 Moreover, the circumstances
surrounding these votes are also important in revealing the incon-
gruent interests of incumbent politicians. In each instance, the city
councils had unanimously voted against competitive entry." This
evidence is hardly surprising in light of the pattern of anti-competi-
tiveness established in numerous court battles waged by cities to
retain their rights to bar competition,"9 a position ardently defended
by their lobbying associations, most notably the National League of
25. Cable industry analyst John Mansell writes: "Cable's legislative head-aches are a
by-product of the Cable Act. Rate deregulation curtailed local leverage, thereby forcing
franchising authorities to threaten more drastic action in order to extract commitments."
PAUL KAGAN Assoc., CABLE TV FRANCHISING 1 (May 31, 1989). For a list of other
concurrences, see Hazlett, supra note 17.
26. Hazlett, supra note 2, at 109 n.160.
27. Id.
28. The City of Los Angeles has defended its right to monopoly franchise cable all
the way to the U.S. Supreme Court and back, in a largely unsuccessful effort, despite
employing a selection process which did not even examine prices. Preferred Communica-
tions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), affd 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
Rates were set after the franchise award, in bilateral negotiations. See Harris, City Trying
to Pick a Cable Service Using Old, Incomplete Data, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 30, 1981, at
l1-1, 11-3.
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Cities." My primary contention that abstract economic analysis is
insufficient to appropriately address the actual policy question is not
adequately addressed by Smiley's response that, theoretically
speaking, many policies can be devised.
In the three years since I began this particular investigation, the
cable competition question has been further ignited by the significant
prospect of TELCO 0 entry into the cable television market.3'
Virtually all of the strategic entry issues raised by both my Article
and Dr. Smiley's Comment could well be obviated with such an
entrant, and the apparent viability of such has produced near panic
in the cable television industry. In many respects, video provision by
TELCOs, or their cable television supplier customers,32 renders the
entire question of "natural monopoly" moot. But the old sources of
protectionism will not instantly cease to exert themselves. Indeed, in
appropriately raising the specter of competition to coaxial copper
cable in the form of fiber optics, Smiley misses the political dynamic
which carries over from one technology to the next.
This political dynamic is evident in the current policy debate
concerning telco entry. The National League of Cities"3 endorsed
federal relaxation of the rules prohibiting telephone company
provision of television services in their local phone service areas in
a lengthy brief filed with the Federal Communications Commission
in late 1988." However, they have hardly adopted a free entry
position. Their brief stresses the importance of strengthening local
control, meaning of course, the municipal franchising process. From
the standpoint of the franchisers, the simple public choice economics
is that more demand for the monopoly franchise is preferred to less.
The cities want the telcos freed from federal restraints, but certainly
not liberated from the local franchising loop.
29. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying texL
30. TELCO is a cable industry term for telephone company.
31. See Hazlett, Should Telephone Companies Provide Cable TV? (forthcoming
REGULATON, Winter 1990).
32. TELCOs need not provide cable television directly, but could build and maintain
copper or fiber systems to lease to competitive, i.e., second entrant, cable companies.
33. They have been joined by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National
Conference of Black Mayors, and the National Association of Telecommunications Officers
and Administrators (local cable regulators) in this position. NATOA Joins in Endorsing Telco
Competition Proposal, Multichannel News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 4.
34. See National League of Cities, Comments of the National League of Cities, In the
Matter of Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules Sections 63.54-
63.58, FCC 88-249 37426, CC Docket No. 87-266 (Dec. 16, 1988).
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This point has not been missed by other observers of the local
franchising scene, induding the Ohio Public Utilities Commission.
The Commission filed a brief in the same telco cross-ownership rule-
making proceeding. They endorsed the FCC's proposal to open
cable to telco competition, but were careful to include the likely
behavior of local government franchisers in the policy equation. The
Commission noted that:
Clearly, the franchise mechanism, on either an exclusive or
non-exclusive basis, tends to inhibit competition to the detri-
ment of consumers .... Competition is the natural alterna-
tive to regulation in guarding against monopoly abuses.
However, viable competition in the cable market requires
removing or modifying artificial barriers to entry such as the
telephone company cross-ownership ban and local franchising."6
The FCC correctly sees that simply permitting telco entry is
insufficient. The pro-competitive mandate requires "preempt[ion of]
local franchising authorities to the extent necessary to eliminate this
artificial barrier to entry."3" Otherwise, the intensified competition in
cable would inure to the benefit of only franchising agents empow-
ered to cut better political deals, and not to consumers shopping
for cable television.
Conclusion
Smiley settles on the safe-sounding admonition that "generali-
zations about the appropriate role of overbuild competition are likely
to be misleading," u and re-recommends a case-by-case approach. Yet,
he succeeds not in overcoming generalization, but only in obscuring
it in his assumption that, generally speaking, local governments are
best able to make the welfare trade-offs in the consumer's interest. 9
35. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Initial Comments of the Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio, In the Matter of Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-
Ownership Rules, Sections 63.54-63.58, CC Docket No. 87-266 (Dec. 1, 1988).
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. Id. at 12.
38. Smiley, supra note 1, at 131.
39. Indeed, at one point, he elects to straightforwardly argue this point. Id. at 135
n.49. This cannot be a side issue, however, as his primary policy proposition is that
gemnaUy local government possesses superior regulatory instincts than offered by a blanket
federal open entry (or other) pre-emption. Yet, the operational importance of this defense
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The evidence regarding price and quality improvement in competi-
tive markets, as well as the data from rate regulation and the
franchising process itself, show that promoting free entry into cable
television markets is, in general, the pro-consumer policy option
which is realistically available.
of municipal authority is largely eliminated in the retraction regarding the inalienability of
constitutional rights; it is the First Amendment that will open cable markets to competition.
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